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1. Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of different regulatory systems on the degree of market
risk to which a regulated company is exposed. Market risk, unlike firmn-specific,
idiosyncratic risk, cannot be eliminated by means of portfolio diversification and is
therefore of great importance to risk-averse investors. A higher level of market risk must
be compensated with higher average retums, thus an increase in non-diversifiable risk
raises a company's cost of capital.
Price-cap regulation as practised in the UK is widely thought to provide superior
incentives for cost efficiency compared with US-style rate-of-return regulation, benefiting
consumers in the long run through lower prices. However, there is a possible drawback of
price controls: in its pure form, this type of regulation takes no account of cost or demand
changes related to the economic cycle, thus raising the degree of market risk to which a
company is exposed. This 'regulatory risk' increases the company's cost of capital as
investors require higher average returns in compensation. Ultimately, consumer prices
must be raised so that the company can finance its investments, undermining the benefits
in terms of lower prices from the efficiency gains associated with the system.
A few studies have attempted to compare the risks associated with the UK price-cap
system and US rate-of-return regulation by studying the asset beta coefficients' of utility
companies in these two countries. In general, US utilities are found to have much lower
asset beta values, supporting the hypothesis that rate-of-return regulation involves lower
regulatory risk. However, the observed difference in beta values may be due to a number
of other factors and could, therefore, have little or nothing to do with alternative
regulatory systems. The companies' operating environments are very different, with
variations in the level of competition, market risks, geographical composition and non-
utility activities.
1 Section 2.2 explains the difference between asset betas and equity betas.
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In order to study the effects of alternative regulatory regimes on market risk, it is
necessary to control for all other factors that may influence beta values. However, it is not
feasible to find two companies that are similar in every respect apart from their regulatory
systems and such a straightforward comparison cannot be made. A study involving a
large number of companies, operating in environments that are similar in some respects
but different in others, should allow the effects of various factors to be disentangled so
that the influence of regulation on the cost of capital may be inferred. This paper
considers evidence from a large number of countries, covering Europe, North and South
America, and the Pacific region.
Linked to the above question of considering the whole regime, is the problem of focusing
on just one specific element of what is a complete financial package. Betas cannot be
studied in isolation from the determination of the rate base, the way in which investment
is treated, and several other financial factors. This analysis focuses on one specific
element of regulation: namely, the systematic risk of utilities operating under different
regulatory regimes.
Another benefit of this approach, aside from the US/UK studies, is that the UK can be
compared with other newly-established systems of regulation. Even if the higher beta
values of UK compared with US utilities can be attributed to regulatory risk, this may be
because the US system is long established and enshrined in case law whereas the UK
regime is new and subject to change (particularly by political influences), rather than the
difference between rate-of-return and price-cap regulation per se. A comparison of
recently privatised companies under alternative systems of regulation will allow a more
accurate assessment of the effect of regime differences on the cost of capital.
There are also a few cases where a shift of regulatory regime occurs within a country.
Such an example is useful as it automatically controls for market factors and should
therefore provide an accurate picture of the influence of the regulatory regime on the cost
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of capital. Care must be taken, however, if other factors change at the same time: for
example, a change in regulatory regime is often accompanied by liberalisation to increase
competition in the sector. The data series must be split into two periods, corresponding to
the two regulatory regimes, so that beta values can be calculated in each case. The date at
which the break should be made is less clear than may be thought: if the change is
anticipated, the shift in beta occurs at the announcement date, but if it takes time for
investors to learn about the change and its effects, a later date may be appropriate.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 examines the measurement of a company's
systematic risk, while the influence of alternative regulatory systems on this form of risk
is considered in Section 3. Other factors affecting systematic risk and the cost of capital,
which tend to obscure international comparisons of regulatory risk using beta values, are
covered in Section 4. After outlining the possible approaches to analysing regulatory risk
using international data in Section 5, calculated beta values and significant comparisons
are summarised in Section 6. Section 7 reviews these results and considers what
conclusions concerning regulatory risk may be drawn from this study.
There are four appendices to this paper. Appendix Al considers the practical and
conceptual difficulties that arise when estimating beta values. These problems are likely
to be particularly serious when international comparisons are made, such that the beta
estimates for different countries may be biased to differing extents or in different
directions, which could result in distorted and misleading estimates. Appendix A2
contains details of asset beta values estimated for companies in a wide variety of
countries and utility sectors. Appendix A3 illustrates the effect of varying the interval
length of the data from which beta estimates are derived, and Appendix A4 examines
confidence limits for beta estimates.
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2. Market Risk and the Cost of Capital
2.1 Risk and return
Risk-averse investors holding a portfolio of assets wish to maximise their returns and
minimise the degree of risk to which they are exposed. When a stake is held in a
particular security, two types of risk must be considered. Firm-specific risk, unlike market
risk, can be eliminated by portfolio diversification as changes in one share price will be
offset by opposing movements in others. All securities, however, bear a degree of market
risk which cannot be reduced by diversification. This form of risk is due to economy-
wide factors which affect all securities simultaneously, although to varying degrees. For
example, when an economy enters recession, most companies tend to be adversely
affected, although the extent of the falls in turnover and profit will differ across firms.
Because it cannot be reduced by diversification, investors demand greater returns in
compensation for bearing a higher level of market risk, thus increasing the cost of capital.
The most commonly used measure of the undiversifiable risk associated with a company
is its equity beta value. This measures the extent to which the returns on the security
moves with the market as a whole. It is defined as follows:
PEi = covariance (rirm)
variance (rm)
where: ,IEi = beta value for security i;
ri = return on security i;
rm = return on the market portfolio.
4
2.2 Asset betas
The equity beta measures two types of risk; fundamental business risk and financial risk.
When making comparisons across countries it is the fundamental risk that should be
compared. This is measured through the asset beta. Comparable asset beta values can be
calculated as follows:
IAi = PEi (1 - Gi) + GI. fiDi
where: PAi = asset beta for security i;
P3 i, = equity beta for security i;
Gi = gearing ratio for security i.
BDi = debt beta for security i.
Correction for gearing differences is particularly important in an international context.
For example, firms in the United States tend to be highly geared relative to those in the
UK due to differences in tax policy, institutional arrangements, industrial structure and
business culture. Changes in gearing ratios over time must also be taken into account. If a
company has experienced significant shifts in gearing (or any other factor), beta values
must be calculated over fairly short periods, otherwise the resulting estimate is an average
of several regimes and is not very meaningful. For this reason, the beta estimates in this
paper have been produced using daily data over periods of a small number of years.
A general assumption that is applied is that fiDi = 0; this simplifies the calculation of the
amount to:
Ai = Ei (I- G)
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The validity of the JDi = 0 assumption can be questioned, especially when debt forms a
large proportion of the capital structure of a company. 2 However, for the purposes of this
study the standard assumption will be applied. The impact of non-zero debt betas is
investigated further in Appendix 1.
2The debt beta can be estimated as 13Di = ERP
ERP
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3. The Effect of Regulatory Structure on Risk
The design of a regulatory system has a significant impact on the degree of systematic
risk borne by a company. In general, there is a trade-off between incentives to improve
efficiency and the degree of risk to which a company is exposed. A company will not
strive to lower its costs unless it benefits from these redactions, but an inability to pass on
cost changes to customers means that the company faces risk from uncontrollable cost
fluctuations.
The impacts of alternative regulatory regimes may be illustrated by means of the
following formula for a company's profits:
rI = PQ -Cx(Q) -Cn(Q
where: rl = total profits;
P = unit price;
Q = quantity sold;
PQ = revenue earned;
C. = exogenous (uncontrollable) costs, a function of quantity;
C, = endogenous (controllable) costs, a function of quantity.
Table 3.1 shows the coverage of alternative regulatory regimes: in each case, some
elements of the profit formula are controlled by regulation while others are ignored, so
that the company has incentives to act efficiently. These are the 'pure' cases; hybrids can
be designed to allow a different set of elements to be controlled.
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Table 3.1: Profit elements covered by alternative regulatory regimes
Regulatory system Covered by regulation Ignored by regulation
Price cap P Q, Cx, C.
Price cap with cost pass-through P, Cx Q, C.
Revenue cap PQ C., C.
Rate-of-return regulation PQ, C', C.
3.1 Price-cap regulation
Pure price-cap regulation involves the setting of prices over a long period of time such
that a well-run company can expect to earn a fair rate of return, but the opportunity to
earn higher profits gives it a greater incentive for efficiency. The system is forward-
looking: reasonable cost levels must be forecast far into the future with a high degree of
accuracy so that reasonable prices can be set. If this is done effectively, higher profits
come from greater efforts by the company in reducing its cost levels below those which
were reasonably expected and reflect the efficiency benefits of the system.
However, the desirable incentive properties of price-cap regulation have a cost in terms of
the risk to which the company is exposed. The lack of automatic price adjustment
mechanisms means that the company is exposed to all cost changes, including those over
which it has no control. The risks involved in price-cap regulation are likely to be
reflected in its cost of capital, as investors will demand a higher average rate of return in
compensation for bearing additional risk.
In practice, price-cap regulation requires periodic price reviews in order to correct
imbalances and eventually to pass the benefits of greater efficiency on to customers. At
this point, the price-cap system bears some similarities to rate-of-return regulation, as one
important consideration in the setting of prices is the rate of return that the company may
be expected to earn at those levels.
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When utility privatisations were carried out in the UK, a price-cap system, known as
RPI - X, was introduced to regulate monopoly businesses. Under this regime, price levels
are constrained to rise each year only by the amount of the retail (consumer) price index
(RPI) minus an efficiency factor, X (or plus a K factor in the case of the water
companies). Price-cap regulation was also introduced into the regulation of the US
telecommunications company AT&T in 1989.
3.2 Price caps with cost pass-through
In recognition of the fact that certain cost elements are beyond the control of the regulated
company and that exposure to such variables increases risk with no benefit in terms of
incentives, most price-cap regimes allow for some cost pass-through. These mechanisms
allow certain cost changes outside of the company's control to be passed on to customers
without waiting for the next periodic price review. The level of risk borne by investors is
lowered and the company's cost of capital should therefore be reduced, while the
incentive properties of the system are not undermined as long as these cost elements are
truly uncontrollable.
The only drawback for a regulated company is the possibility that cost pass-through may
be carried out in an asymmetric manner and therefore expose the company to more, rather
than less, risk. The regulator may use discretionary powers to recoup company profits
when exogenous costs have fallen (say, lower construction costs due to the recent slump
in the building industry), but then refuse to allow unavoidable cost increases to be passed
on to customers. Thus, unless cost pass-through mechanisms are formalised so as to be
fair to both the company and its customers, they could give rise to asymmetric risk and
increase rather than lower beta values.
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Most of the UK RPI - X formulae allow for certain uncontrollable cost elements to be
passed through to customers. The water companies were initially allowed to pass through
a variety of uncontrollable cost elements, such as rates, construction expenditure and the
costs of compliance with new legal requirements, although the number and extent of
these 'relevant changes of circumstance' has since been curtailed.3 In the electricity
industry, the regional electricity companies (RECs) are permitted to pass on any changes
in electricity generation costs (although these are subject to separate controls). In
Argentina, on the other hand, electricity companies are not entitled to automatic pass-
through of fuel costs, presumably to give them an incentive to generate electricity as
cheaply as possible and to respond to changes in relative fuel prices by altering the fuel
mix.
3.3 Revenue caps
A revenue cap places a limit on the total income of the company rather than the per-unit
price it charges. This system makes sense when the majority of a company's costs are
fixed rather than increasing with the number of units sold. A company with high fixed
costs that is under price-cap regulation faces excessive risk from demand fluctuations as
these movements significantly affect the company's income but leave its cost level
relatively unchanged. Thus, a revenue cap reduces the risk-exposure of the company
without undermining cost incentives in any way (as long as the permitted revenue is not
based on actual cost levels).
In the UK, Northern Ireland Electricity was privatised in June 1993 with a revenue-cap
rather than a price-cap formula, while partial revenue caps have been introduced for the
RECs and National Grid Company following periodic reviews. This change was due
partly to arguments concerning the level of fixed costs in the industry, which the
3 The companies that agreed to the changes were allowed a higher rate of return at the 1994 Periodic
Review in recognition of the increased cost of capital arising from the loss of cost pass-through.
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companies claim are not recouped through the existing fixed charges to customers, and
also to correct a perverse incentive effect of the pure price-cap system. When company
income is linked to the number of units sold while costs are mainly fixed, the companies
have no incentive to encourage the efficient use of electricity. In fact, companies would
gain by encouraging customers to waste power, in conflict with the energy-efficiency
measures that they are supposed to encourage.
Several variants of revenue-cap regulation are available. A pure revenue cap sets a lump-
sum annual amount without reference to actual cost elements, presumably based on
historical levels. Alternatively, permitted revenues could be linked to an observable
feature, such as the number of customers, to which fixed cost levels are related. This
would allow changes in the exogenous factors driving fixed costs to be matched by
changes in revenue without waiting for the next periodic review. Another possibility is
the use of an hybrid price/revenue cap to mimic the balance between fixed and variable
costs in the industry, so that incentives to increase sales are not distorted. This essentially
is the approach now taken in the regulation of the UK electricity industry.
3.4 Rate-of-return regulation
Under pure rate-of-return regulation, a company is guaranteed an agreed rate of return on
capital and its prices are adjusted as required to ensure that this rate is earned. In this
situation, the company bears very little risk as any unforeseen costs can quickly be passed
on to customers. Due to the lack of risk, the agreed rate of return can be fairly low and
prices to customers can be kept down.
In practice, however, rate-of-return regulation is not this straightforward or free from risk.
Price adjustment reviews, although frequent, do not allow instantaneous cost pass-
through and the company is exposed to some risk. The rate-of-return system encourages
over-capitalisation by companies, as allowable profits are directly related to the size of
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the capital base, and regulators in the United States have responded to this by disallowing
(for regulatory purposes) any capital expenditure seen to have been imprudently incurred.
The need for regulatory approval adds to investment risks, particularly if the regulator
cannot precommit to including the asset in the capital base. If investors feel that they are
not assured of gaining a return on their investment, a higher allowed rate of return will be
required on projects that gain approval so that the ex ante expected rate of return is
sufficient for funds to be obtained.
3.5 Hybrid and discretionary systems
3.5.1 Price/revenue cap
As explained in Section 3.3, revenue caps have recently been introduced into the
regulatory formulae of the UK electricity industry to reflect the level of fixed costs
in the industry. This has generally been achieved in conjunction with the existing
price caps rather than by replacing them altogether. Hybrid price/revenue caps are
now applied to the distribution businesses of the RECs in England and Wales, and
to the transmission and distribution revenues of Northern Ireland Electricity.
A pure revenue cap should not be used in industries with a high level of marginal
costs as, in this case, an increase in demand would raise costs with no matching
increase in revenues, exposing the company to excessive risk. Rather, an hybrid
price/revenue cap should be used to mimic the balance between fixed and
marginal costs, so that the company is given the correct incentives to promote
sales and is not exposed to excessive risks from demand fluctuations. Cost-
efficiency incentives are maintained since the regulated company benefits in full
from any cost-reducing activities it undertakes.
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3.5.2 Price-cap/rate-of-return regulation
Most regulatory systems can be regarded as hybrids between pure rate-of-return
and pure price-cap regulation, depending on the length of time that elapses
between reviews and the degree of automatic cost pass-through. For example, the
UK RPI - X price-cap system reviews prices approximately every five years and,
in most sectors, allows pass-through of certain unavoidable costs. Discretionary
powers may also be used to recoup excessive profits between periodic reviews, in
effect, reducing the price-cap system to a rate-of-return regime. The ability of the
regulator to claw back high profits exposes the regulated company to asymmetric
risk, as high profit rates cannot be earned but there is no corresponding floor on
the amount of losses that may be made.
To reduce the degree of asymmetric risk, it must be made clear that discretionary
powers will be used to protect companies from excessive and unexpected cost
increases, as well as to recoup excess profits, so that the companies' downside
risks are also curtailed. For example, the water companies may press for an
assurance that allowance will be made for the costs of complying with any
additional environmental requirements which they may face in the future.
Explicit hybrid schemes may place a floor and a ceiling on the rate of return
which may be earned by a regulated company. Alternatively, a less extreme
system might allow all profits to be kept in a band around the 'target' rate of
return, while any further gain or loss relative to this level is shared between the
company and its customers. Explicit profit-sharing or 'sliding-scale' regulation
was used in the UK and United States in the late nineteenth century and is
currently under discussion in the UK.4 Under such a scheme, a sharing rule
divides excess profits between customers and shareholders by allowing dividend
or rate-of-return increases only if prices are simultaneously cut.
4 For further details see Burns, Turvey and Weyman-Jones (1995), 'Sliding scale regulation of monopoly
enterprises', Centre for the Study of Regulated Industries, Discussion Paper 11, May.
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An example of sliding-scale regulation is the system governing the New York
Telephone Company established in 1986, which operated according to the
following rules.
Table 3.2: An example of sliding-scale regulation
Rate of return, R (%) Adjustment to revenues
Over 15 Revenues adjusted down by ½/2(R - 15)
Between 13 and 15 No adjustment
Under 13 Revenues adjusted up by '2(13 - R)
Source: Laffont and Tirole (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT
Press, p. 16.
Under this scheme, full cost-efficiency incentives are retained in the intermediate
band of 13-15% as any profit changes are passed through to the company in full.
In the higher and lower bands, incentives are weakened as 50% of any gain or loss
accrues to customers: this is the cost of avoiding excessive profits on the upside
and excessive risk to the company on the downside. Incentives are stronger than
under US-style rate-of-return regulation but far weaker than under the price-cap
system.
3.5.3 Discretionary systems
In many countries, particularly in continental Europe, utility companies are
controlled without the kind of explicit regulatory framework that exists in the UK
and United States. In Austria, for example, gas prices are set by a committee
composed of a wide spectrum of interests, with representatives from government
ministries, industry, agriculture and labour.
Under a discretionary system, it is unclear what criteria are used in setting prices
and the regime cannot even be approximated to rate-of-return or price-cap
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regulation. It seems unlikely that high-powered efficiency incentives are in force
or that high profits or losses may ever be made, thus the system seems close to
rate-of-return regulation. On the other hand, the scope for political interference
may expose companies to excessive risk and cause their beta values to be higher
than those of US utility companies.
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4. Other Factors Affecting the Cost of Capital
This section examines factors other than the form of regulatory regime which have an
impact on the beta value of a regulated company. In this study it is very important that
such influences are taken into account as they prevent any straightforward comparison
being drawn between the beta values of utility companies operating under alternative
regulatory regimes. International variations in these factors are briefly outlined as these
must be considered as possible explanations for any cross-country differences that may be
found in estimated beta values.
4.1 Ownership
Although this study covers only privately-owned, quoted companies, many have partial or
even majority stakes held by the national government. In some countries, the national
constitution or public sentiment prevents full privatisation of utility companies, while in
others, partial privatisation is merely a prelude to full floatation. In several European
countries, the mix of state and private ownership is the result of the historical
development of these industries and may vary widely across sectors and geographical
regions.
Partial or majority government ownership is likely to have the following effects on a
company:
* implicit state control over prices and other business matters;
* protection from bankruptcy and takeover;
* a lower cost of capital as the government is seen as the ultimate guarantor of any
debt.
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Government protection from bankruptcy and takeover should reduce a company's cost of
capital, but political interference in business activities may increase it. In a few cases,
privatisation is complete but the government retains a 'golden share', enabling it to veto
any proposed takeover bid. The golden shares in the UK water companies and the RECs
were redeemed in December 1994 and March 1995 respectively.
Additional controls were enforced through a 15% shareholding rule, preventing
individual shareholders from holding more than 15% of a company's voting equity. This
control was removed from all water companies apart from Welsh Water in December
1994 and is due to be removed from all RECs in the year 2000. However, the restriction
can be abolished by an extraordinary general meeting, a move which so far has been taken
by the majority of RECs. These changes are summarised in Table 4.1. It is possible that
these changes may affect the companies' cost of capital, if the sensitivity of their share
prices to the state of the economy has been altered.
Table 4.1: Abolition of government controls in UK utility sectors
Date Event
December 31st 1994 Abolition of golden shares in the water companies
Abolition of the 15% shareholding rule in all water companies apart from
Welsh Water
March 31st 1995 Abolition of golden shares in the RECs
March 31st 2000 Abolition of the 15% rule in any RECs where it still applies
Golden shares and limits on the level of shareholding are seen in other countries;
Copenhagen Airport is one such example.
Utility privatisations in South America have frequently taken place through the sale of an
initial stake to a private (perhaps international) consortium followed by a public flotation
at a later date. This procedure increases the value of the company at flotation due to
improvements made during the initial period of private operation, which may also involve
the introduction of foreign expertise. It may result, however, in the final structure of the
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company being dominated by the stakeholdings of companies involved in the preliminary
private sale, which may therefore exercise considerable control over the company and
affect its cost of capital.
In south-east Asia, limited privatisation of utility industries has generally occurred via
private finance deals for new projects rather than the sale of existing state-owned assets.
In such a deal, a private consortium is granted a concession to build and operate a plant
for a fixed period, after which ownership may be transferred to the national government.
In the absence of any public flotation, equity betas cannot be calculated. Instead, the risk
of the project will be incorporated into the cost of capital of the participating companies,
which frequently include foreign utilities.
4.2 Product market competition
The degree of market risk involved in holding a company's shares is likely to be
influenced by the level of competition in the relevant industry. A monopolistic firm has
more power than a competitive company to pass unavoidable cost changes on to
consumers and it is therefore less exposed to business risks. It would therefore be
expected that a monopoly firm would have a lower beta coefficient than a competitive
firm operating under otherwise similar circumstances.
When a utility sector is privatised, governments have a choice between restructuring the
industry to introduce competition where feasible, or simply selling off an existing
monopoly firm. In the UK, restructuring was considered only in the later utility
privatisations: the electricity sector was restructured prior to privatisation whereas the gas
and telecommunications industries had been privatised as monopolies. In Argentina,
considerable restructuring took place before privatisation, with the gas and electricity
sectors being vertically and horizontally separated.
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In the telecommunications sector, new entry has occurred since privatisation and this may
be expected to change the beta coefficient of the incumbent firm. In the UK, Mexico and
Peru, statutory monopolies on fixed-line telephone services have already been
undermined by the introduction of new technology, such as cellular networks, by
competitors.
4.3 Industry structure
The degree of vertical integration of an industry may have an impact on the level of
market risk to which a company is exposed. Different parts of an industry tend to differ in
their systematic risk levels: in the gas and electricity industries, for example, trading
businesses tend to be more risky than the transportation or transmission sectors. Thus, if a
company operates in a single part of a vertically separated industry it must be compared
with other companies operating in the same sector.
The beta coefficient of a vertically integrated company might be expected to be an
average of the betas of its individual component businesses. However, this does not
always appear to be the case (although such comparisons are difficult to make). It is
possible that a vertically integrated company may be able to manage its operating and
investment decisions in such a way that it is better able to deal with cyclical fluctuations.
Such 'beta synergy' is possible due to the impracticality of writing 'complete' contracts
and the existence of residual control rights conferred by ownership which cannot be
replicated through contracts. Another possibility is that a vertically integrated company
may be able to foreclose potentially competitive sectors of the business and maintain
monopoly power. In either case, a vertically integrated company may be expected to have
a lower beta value than the average of its component parts.
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4.4 Diversity of operation
A serious difficulty arises in trying to estimate the beta coefficient for a utility sector in
that few companies are pure utility operators. First, in many countries the same
companies operate in the electricity, gas and water sectors, making a separate beta value
for each of these sectors impossible to estimate. In both the United States and Germany,
for example, it is usual for energy companies to supply both electricity and gas to a
particular geographical area. In such cases, beta values of companies with a similar utility
mix may be compared with one another but not with those of other companies which
operate in a single utility sector.
Second, many companies which operate in a single utility sector have diversified into
non-utility areas, such as engineering and environmental services, communications,
property management and leisure activities. Again, it is not possible to estimate separate
beta coefficients for different divisions of a company, so the pure utility beta cannot be
determined. The non-utility areas tend to be unregulated, competitive and more risky than
the core utility services, thus diversification is expected to increase a company's beta
coefficient. This can help explain why some beta estimates appear unstable in Appendix 2
when the annual estimates are calculated.
Several large utility companies have international interests in the same utility sector. In
particular, many European and US companies are involved in utility projects in south-east
Asia and South America. Different types of involvement exist including equity
participation in existing companies and stand-alone projects. These deals often allow the
company to build a power station or water-treatment plant and then operate it at a profit
for a certain period of time before ownership of the asset passes to the state. They are
likely to be far riskier than capital investments in the domestic market, due to political
risks and greater uncertainty over building costs and future revenues. A company with
considerable involvement in overseas projects is therefore expected to have a higher beta
value than one which operates solely in the relatively secure domestic market.
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5. Empirical Approaches
Two types of comparison may be carried out using international data on privately-owned
utility companies. First, comparisons may be drawn between companies operating in the
same utility sector but in different countries where alternative regulatory regimes are in
force. Second, the effects of changing regulatory systems on systematic risk may be
assessed by studying the same number of cases where such shifts have occurred. This
section considers these approaches in turn.
5.1 Cross-country comparisons
Cross-country comparisons of utility beta coefficients are informative if one of the
following two circumstances applies:
two companies in the same utility sector, but operating in different countries, are
similar in every respect apart from their regulatory regime;
* a number of companies in the same utility sector operating in different countries
differ in many respects, which may or may not include their regulatory regimes.
The first case is a straightforward comparison of regulatory systems, controlling for all
other influences. This is the ideal form of international comparison but it is impossible to
carry out because such a pair of comparators does not exist-often, even within a country,
it is difficult to find two directly comparable companies. Direct comparisons of just two
countries without regard for other important differences, such as the existing UK/US
studies, are likely to be misleading and reveal little about the influence of regulatory risk
on the cost of capital.
The second case is more complex but is more likely to allow the effects of alternative
regulatory regimes to be inferred. Provided that a sufficient number of comparator
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countries can be assessed and all important factors affecting the cost of capital can be
identified. It should be possible to disentangle these effects and determine the importance
of regulatory risk. Although a full regression analysis may be preferable,5 broad indicative
values may be established by averaging a number of companies operating under similar
regulatory regimes despite differences in other factors.
Averaging is not a perfect way of controlling for differences in the other explanatory
factors but if sufficient companies from a wide enough sample of countries are used, the
impact of other explanatory factors should be lessened. Of course, if all the companies
under one type of regime face additional risks that bias the beta coefficient upwards then
averaging will have no effect. This extreme situation is unlikely.
5.2 Within-country comparisons
In a few countries, existing regulatory systems have been significantly reformed. If this
has taken place without industrial restructuring or other changes occurring around the
same date, an effective control for non-regulatory factors is available. The data series
must be split at the appropriate date and two beta values estimated, and any significant
difference between the two should reflect a shift in regulatory risk.
Changes have been made to existing frameworks of regulation in the UK, where the
price-cap system is now tending towards revenue-cap regulation, and in the United States,
Japan and Spain, where price controls and efficiency incentives are being introduced into
existing rate-of-return regulation systems. In Malaysia and Argentina, initial
privatisations took place with no consideration being given to regulation; price-cap
systems were introduced at a later date.
5 Dummy variables for specific factors could be introduced, or if the additional explanatory variables are
observable and quantifiable, they could be directly included in the regression.
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In practice, however, analysing structural parameter shifts is not so straightforward. There
are few examples of such reforms, and some have been accompanied by changes in other
influential factors such as the degree of competition in the industry. The assessment of
recent reforms is weakened by the scarcity of data: when the returns series is short, even
daily returns give such an imprecise beta estimate that significant effects are difficult to
identify. Another difficulty is the role of expectations in the stock market, these are
important in determining the date at which the structural shift occurs. If the change in
regulation is anticipated prior to its implementation, the shift in beta occurs at the
announcement date, while, alternatively, if investors take time to learn about the change
and its effects, a later date may be appropriate.
Another possibility is to compare the beta values of various utility sectors in a particular
country where all are subject to the same regulatory system and degree of competition.
This would allow sector-specific risk factors to be identified, which may assist the
analysis of regulatory differences. For example, a comparison of the electricity and gas
industries in a single country where structural and regulatory factors are identical may
allow the difference in market risk levels to be identified. This may then assist in drawing
comparisons between combined energy companies (such as those found in Germany and
the United States) and separate electricity and gas industries in other countries.
23
6. Methodology and Results
6.1 Choice of stock market index
In calculating beta values, it is usual to use an established stock market index as a proxy
for the market portfolio. In several countries, a choice of possible indices is available.
Furthermore, a few large companies are quoted on more than one stock exchange, raising
the possibility of calculating beta values using data from a foreign stock market. World
indices are also available, quoted in either US dollars or pounds sterling, which appeared
initially to be a more appropriate market portfolio from which the beta estimates could be
derived.
The findings of this report are illustrated by the case of the US telecommunications
operator, AT&T, as shown in Table 6.1. AT&T is quoted in both dollars and pounds
sterling, thus beta estimates could be calculated using a range of US, UK and world
indices as shown. The two world indices ($ and £) give significantly lower beta estimates
than the two US indices (NYSE All-share and Dow Jones Composite 65), while the two
UK indices (FTSE-A All-share and FTSE 100) produce estimates which are lower still.
These results indicate that systematic risk is largely country-specific and a meaningful
beta estimate can only be derived using a national index from the company's own country
of operation. Beta estimates calculated using a world index reflect the proportion of the
index that is made up of the relevant country's securities, rather than the riskiness of the
company in question. Quotations on foreign stock markets are likely to incorporate
exchange-rate effects, which further undermine these estimates as an accurate measure of
beta. For these reasons, beta estimates have only been calculated against national
indices-although there is a risk that different stock markets will produce beta estimates
that are not entirely comparable, the use of a world index or quotations on foreign stock
markets does not appear to overcome this problem.
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If attention is restricted to national stock markets, several indices are generally available.
Often the choice is between an 'all-share' index and one that is only made up of the
largest or most frequently traded companies. In an analysis of the interval problem (see
Section 6.2 and Appendices A1.3 and A3), the beta values of large companies (as the
utilities tend to be) are found to have a smaller, upwards bias when calculated against an
index consisting only of frequently traded shares. As is clear from Table 6.1 for AT&T,
the large-security indices (Dow Jones Composite 65 and FTSE 100) produce lower beta
estimates than their respective all-share indices. Economic theory suggests that large-
security indices would produce more accurate beta estimates as they are less prone to
price adjustment lags, and so, where possible, beta estimates in this paper have been
derived from large-security national stock market indices.
Table 6.1: Daily asset beta estimates for AT&T against alternative indices
NYSE All-share Dow Jones Composite 65 World ($) World (£) FT All-share FTSE 100
0.85 0.72 0.42 0.35 0.20 0.17
In the case of AT&T, the value of 0.72, calculated using the Dow Jones Composite 65
index, has been chosen as the best estimate of the true beta value.
6.2 Choice of interval length
Another important issue is the frequency of the data used in calculating beta. Returns
calculated over a daily, weekly, monthly or even longer period may be used in the
calculation, but there is a trade-off between two problems. Literature on the interval
problem (see Appendix Al.3 for a brief review) suggests that short-interval estimates are
systematically biased, such that the beta values of highly traded securities are overstated
while those of infrequently traded securities are understated. Use of longer intervals, on
the other hand, lowers the number of data points available for the calculation and the
25
accuracy of the estimate is significantly reduced. A monthly beta estimate, for example,
requires at least five years' data (60 data points) to be used while a daily beta can be
calculated for a single year (around 250 data points). The latter estimate is the more
meaningful if a company is subject to changes in its operating environment or regulatory
regime, as explained in Appendix A1.4.
Examples shown in Appendix A3 show the extent of the interval problem. Beta estimates
for British Gas fall as the interval length is increased while those of the two US water
companies rise with the interval length, as expected from the fact that the former is large
and frequently traded while the latter are infrequently traded. US gas companies show a
mixture of trends, reflecting the variety of sizes of the companies in this group. Beta
estimates for the UK RECs rise with the interval length, a slightly surprising result which
implies that these companies are relatively infrequently traded compared with the index
as a whole. It should be noted, however, that the confidence intervals for the longer-
interval estimates are very wide, as shown in Appendix A4. Taking the case of five-year
asset beta estimates for BT, daily data produce a 95% confidence interval of 0.81 to 0.92,
weekly data give a range of 0.79 to 1.02, while the monthly estimate lies between 0.61
and 1.03.
The response taken here to these problems has been to use daily beta estimates in order to
obtain a narrow confidence interval for betas calculated over fairly short periods and to
deal with the interval problem in the following ways. As explained in Section 6. 1, a large-
security index results in a smaller interval-effect bias than an all-share index. Industry
averages have been calculated; where there is a range of company sizes, this procedure
should overcome the bias involved in using any single estimate. This is indicated by the
case of US gas companies given in Appendix A3: the average daily, weekly and monthly
betas for the group as a whole are very close at 0.20, 0.21 and 0.25 respectively, while
individual beta values vary substantially with the interval length.
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6.3 Summary of results
Details of all the beta values calculated for this study can be found in Appendix A2. For
each company, where possible, a five-year beta calculated over the period January 1990
to August 1995 is given in addition to a series of annual betas for the years 1990 to 1994.
All are calculated using daily data and the index used in the calculation is given by the
heading for each country. All estimates are asset betas (ie, corrected for the gearing level
of the individual company) except where stated otherwise.6
Although individual companies are of interest, these results need to be summarised in
some way so that overall trends may be identified. First, average beta values for the utility
sectors in each country were calculated. These results are given in Table 6.2, while Table
6.3 summarises the corresponding regulatory regimes for each sector.
Table 6.2: Average beta values by country and sector
Electricity Gas Energy Water Telecoms
UK 0.60 0.84 - 0.67 0.87
United States 0.30 0.20 0.25 0.29' 0.72 (AT&T)
0.52 (others)
Canada - - 0.25 - 0.31
Japan 0.43 - - - 0.62
Argentina 0.81 e _ _ - 0.86'
Chile 0.95 e _- - 1.20 e
Germany - - 0.66 - -
Spain 0.43 0.81 - 0.57 -
Sweden - 0.34 _ - 0.50
Australia - 0.38 - - -
New Zealand - - - - 0.97
Other European 0.41 0.49 0.46 0.42 0.70
Key: t Monthly beta, e Equity (not asset) beta.
6 Accounting data on a comparable basis was taken from Datastream. This was not available for all of the
countries in the study.
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Table 6.3: Summary of regulatory regimes
Electricity Gas Energy Water Telecoms
UK RPI - X / RPI-X - RPI - X RPI - X
revenue cap
United States RoR RoR RoR RoR AT&T: RPI - X
Others: RoR
Canada - - RoR - RoR
Japan RoR - - - RoR
Argentina RPI - X RPI-X - - RPI -X
Chile RPI-X - - -
hybrid
Germany - - Discretionary
Spain Tariffs based Discretionary
on standard
costs
Sweden Discretionary Discretionary - - RPI - X
Australia - - - -
New Zealand - - - - Anti-competitive
rules, no price
control
Other European Discretionary Discretionary - Discretionary -
Key: RoR = rate-of-return regulation.
Regulatory regimes can be classified according to the strength of cost-efficiency
incentives: RPI - X and revenue-cap regimes involve high-powered incentives, rate-of-
return regulation is low-powered, while European discretionary systems are classed as
intermediate. Cross-country averages for the three types of regime were calculated for
each sector (using only asset betas); these figures are given in Table 6.4. Averaging across
companies that differ in trading frequency, operating environment and other features
should both help to overcome the interval problem and give estimates that reflect
differences in regulatory risk rather than other factors. Finally, averages across sectors
were produced to give a single figure for each regime type, as shown in Table 6.5.
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Table 6.4: Average asset beta values by regulatory regime and sector
Incentives Electricity Gas Energy Water Telecoms
High-powered 0.57 0.84 - 0.67 0.77
Intermediate 0.41 0.57 0.64 0.46 0.70
Low-powered 0.35 0.20 0.25 0.29 0.47
Table 6.5: Average asset beta values across regulatory regimes
Average beta
High-powered 0.71
Intermediate 0.60
Low-powered 0.32
Both the sectoral averages and the overall regime estimates show a clear trend: high-
powered incentives appear to be related to higher systematic risk, while low-powered
incentives imply low market risk.
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7. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has covered a wide range of countries, utility sectors and regulatory systems in
order to analyse the extent of regulatory risk under alternative regimes. Economic theory
suggests that regulatory differences may cause the degree of market risk borne by a
company to vary significantly, with an inverse relationship existing between the degree of
risk and the level of cost-efficiency incentives imposed on the company.
Existing comparisons of regulatory risk tend to be somewhat limited in scope. There is a
clear disparity between the beta values of utility companies in the United States and the
UK, which is usually attributed to the relatively safe operating environment in the United
States provided by rate-of-return regulation. However, the observed difference may be
due to any of a number of alternative factors and cannot be said to prove the existence of
higher regulatory risk in the UK.
This study has covered a much wider sample of countries and regulatory systems in an
attempt to formulate a more robust comparison of the risks borne by companies under
alternative regimes. The method that was used, which averaged across a range of
companies of varying sizes and operating in diverse environments, aimed to overcome the
effects of other exogenous factors and therefore improve the accuracy with which
regulatory risks may be identified. The results show a clear pattern at the level of
individual utility sectors and for regulatory regimes as a whole. Regimes with low-
powered incentives tend to coexist with low asset beta values, while high-powered
incentives imply significantly higher beta values. These results, in accordance with
existing comparisons of regulatory regimes, seem to imply that companies under RPI - X
regulation are exposed to much higher levels of systematic risk in comparison with those
under rate-of-return regulation, and that the cost of capital for these firms is therefore
likely to be higher.
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However, these figures must not be accepted without a number of caveats. First, the
whole project of drawing comparisons between beta values on an international scale is
subject to difficulties. Companies are quoted on individual national stock markets and
different market indices must be used in each case. Indices differ in composition and
calculation methods, introducing a possible source of non-comparability between beta
estimates. For example, in a country where utility companies form a large proportion of
total market capitalisation, the index reflects movements in utility shares to a great extent
and beta estimates will be high.
Furthermore, national stock markets operate in different ways and are prone to different
degrees of interval bias. Utility companies differ in size and, because of this, their beta
values are likely to be biased in different directions. For example, UK utilities tend to be
large relative to the market as a whole, whereas US utilities are regionally based and may
be quite small. For this reason, estimated beta values could be expected to overstate the
degree of market risk borne by UK utilities while the risk incurred by US utilities is
understated. The much-quoted difference between US and UK utility betas, usually
attributed to differences in regulatory risk, may simply reflect the systematic interval-
effect biases that are present in these estimates.
Although this study has covered a wide range of countries and companies, the sectoral
and overall regime averages for high- and low-powered incentives still tend to be
dominated by UK and US companies respectively. This is due to difficulties in finding
the necessary data for suitable comparator companies. In most countries, utility
companies have traditionally been under state or local authority control and the number of
private companies under altemative regulatory regimes is limited. Few European utilities
are under explicit price-cap or rate-of-return regulation, indeed, the United States aside,
clear regulatory systems are a relatively recent phenomenon. Privatisations in developing
countries provide scope for interesting comparisons between regulatory regimes, but
adequate data is difficult to come by and beta estimates derived from these markets are
likely to be even more flawed that those for European and North American companies.
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Where market data does not exist for a country or sector the information reported in this
paper can provide a starting point for the estimation of an appropriate equity beta.
Obviously, qualitative adjustments will have to be made to take account of special
circumstances and specific company betas may assist in this. The data reported in this
study should, however, be of value in providing initial assessments of betas of utilities
operating under different regulatory regimes.
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Appendix Al Estimation Difficulties
This section considers practical and theoretical difficulties involved in estimating beta
coefficients from available data. There are several explanations of why beta coefficients
may be biased, and some of these reasons cause severe problems for international
comparisons of estimated beta values. When these estimates are derived using data from
different stock markets, the extent and direction of bias in each estimate may differ and
the comparison is likely to be very misleading unless corrections can be made for these
distortions.
AM.l Data format and availability
AL.I.A No trade periods
A fundamental assumption of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is that all
securities are continuously traded and that the price at which such trades may take
place is known at each moment in time. In practice, however, shares are traded at
discrete times and there are many periods during which no trades take place.
In many stock markets, the measured price for a given share is the price at which
its latest trade took place. This method opens up the possibility that the notional
price at which a trade would occur may change without any actual trade taking
place, resulting in discrepancies between measured and 'true' values. In more
sophisticated stock exchanges data is available for quotation as well as transaction
prices, which overcomes the no-trade problem in these markets but may distort
comparisons with beta values estimated from transaction data.
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A1.1.2 Transaction costs
A second difficulty is the spread between buying and selling prices arising from
transaction costs, a feature of real-world markets that is ignored by the CAPM.
When considering the returns to a portfolio of assets, these must be calculated as a
percentage of the buying price of the portfolio. Difficulties arise when the bid/ask
spread varies over time, due to changes in transaction procedures or the degree of
competition in stock market trading. Changes in transaction costs affect the
variability of measured returns while true returns remain unaffected, so distorting
calculations of the beta estimate. These changes are unlikely to be synchronised
across international capital markets, so there is no reason to expect that the
direction of bias will be the same in different countries.
A1.1.3 Dividend corrections
The returns to holding equity are made up of two parts: a capital gain on the price
of the share itself and any dividend payments made by the company. Thus, a
calculation of the total return to equity requires a dividend correction. In order that
the variance of a security and its covariance with the market may be calculated
correctly, any dividend payment must be added to the share price at the time when
the payment is made. Many documented returns series treat dividend payments as
if they were spread throughout the year rather than occurring at particular
moments, once or twice a year. International comparisons require returns data to
be constructed on a consistent basis, which should also be as close to the true
values as possible.
A1.1.4 Calculation of returns
As pointed out by Roll (1983),7 the method by which the average returns on a
portfolio or index are calculated can significantly affect their estimated value. Roll
7 Roll (1983), 'On Computing Mean Returns and the Small Firm Premium', Journal of Financial
Economics, 12, 371-386.
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compares three computational methods for obtaining the return on a portfolio of
securities over an interval of time:
* arithmetic: the mean daily return is obtained by averaging across both
firms and days-this is then compounded to give the portfolio return over
a longer period;
* rebalanced: the return on a portfolio is rebalanced at the end of each period
to maintain equal investments;
* buy-and-hold: individual security returns over the required time period are
calculated from daily returns and then averaged over securities to give the
portfolio return.
Roll finds that the method used to calculate mean returns has a significant effect
on the estimated return, such that the apparent premium to holding a portfolio
made up of smaller rather than larger issues is approximately halved when the
buy-and-hold approach is used. He argues that this method is the most plausible as
it mimics the behaviour of actual investors, as their transaction costs prevent
regular rebalancing of portfolios. The buy-and-hold approach is the preferred
method used in academic work on the estimation of beta values, such as Handa et
al. (1989).'
In making international comparisons, it is important to ensure that returns data is
calculated on the same basis, which should preferably be the buy-and-hold
method. This may require new market indices to be calculated, as published
indices tend to be rebalanced and the frequency of adjustment is likely to vary
across countries.
8 Handa, Kothari and Wasley (1989), 'The Relation Between the Return Interval and Betas', Journal of
Financial Economics, 23, 79-100.
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A1.2 Aggregation and the market portfolio
A1.2.1 The market portfolio
The cost of equity finance for an individual security is related to the level of its
non-diversifiable risk. Thus, the variance of the security's returns must be
compared to their covariance with the market portfolio, consisting of the optimal
combination of all available assets. This calculation requires some proxy for the
market portfolio to be used. Ideally, this should be an index of world assets
including not only equities but also bonds and durable goods such as housing.
In practice, however, researchers usually take a national equity market index as a
proxy for the world index. The use of national rather than international markets
can be justified by the argument that today's capital markets are essentially
international and arbitrage ensures that prices and the risk-return trade-off are
equalised between markets. Other assets, such as housing and bonds, are generally
ignored-again, arbitrage is assumed to ensure that the risk-return profile for
these assets mirrors those of the assets included in the index and so their omission
does not cause problems.
However, differences in the composition of national stock markets mean that
comparisons of beta values calculated using national market returns could be
misleading. For example, some small stock markets are dominated by a single
large company, in which case market returns are not representative of the world
index. A few capital markets, such as that of Korea, are insulated from
international influences and are therefore likely to differ considerably from the
world index, rendering a meaningful comparison of beta estimates impossible. It
may be necessary to construct a portfolio of world assets and use its returns index
to estimate beta values for all securities in order to eliminate problems associated
with unrepresentative national markets.
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A1.2.2 Differential taxation and transaction costs
As argued above, arbitrage is a powerful mechanism for ensuring that the risk-
return trade-off is equalised between different types of assets and across countries.
However, even with complete arbitrage, prices are affected by differences in
transaction costs and levels of taxation applied to various assets. Investors respond
to post-tax returns while the companies themselves are concerned about pre-tax
levels, thus variations in this spread affect the cost of capital. In several countries,
steps are being taken to eliminate gross distortions in the tax system, for example,
the recent reductions in the preferential treatment of house purchases in the UK.
However, significant cross-country differences in transaction costs or taxation
systems are likely to undermine the comparability of beta estimates unless
corrections can be made for these distortions.
A1.2.3 Weighting of the index
Another issue concerns the weights that should be applied to different assets in the
market portfolio. A portfolio consisting of an equal investment in each security is
unlikely to be optimal, as most investors would choose to put fewer funds into
very risky assets. Thus, market capitalisation is generally used to weight each
security, so that large companies form a greater proportion of the portfolio.
However, when making international comparisons, there is no guarantee that the
different national market indices are weighted in a consistent manner and
calculation of a new index may be necessary.
A1.3 Choice of interval period
Beta coefficients may be calculated from daily, weekly, monthly or even annual data, as
long as a sufficient number of data points are used. Theoretically, the length of the
interval over which returns are calculated should not affect the result. However, empirical
studies have found the estimated value of beta to alter significantly and systematically
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with the interval length, resulting in a wide-ranging academic debate. Several sources of
bias have been noted and analysed, with conflicting affects on the estimate of beta as the
interval length is increased.
A1.3.1 Non-synchronous trading
Fisher (1966)9 pointed out that the prices recorded at the end of a time interval are
often due to a transaction which occurred earlier in or prior to that period. For this
reason, the market index is in fact an average of the temporally ordered underlying
values of the shares rather than synchronised trades. This causes the returns
calculated from the index to be serially correlated and their estimated variance to
be biased downwards. If, in addition, a share suffers from non-trading or is traded
only infrequently, its covariance with the market will be significantly
underestimated. Both the market variance and an asset's covariance with the
market rise with the return interval, but if these increases are not proportional, the
estimated beta coefficient will be biased. Scholes and Williams (1977)10 find the
following directions of bias in beta estimates when a short interval is used.
Table A1.1: Bias in beta estimation due to non-synchronous trading
Type Direction of bias in beta estimate
Infrequently traded securities Downwards
Securities with average trading frequencies Upwards
Very frequently traded securities Downwards
The availability of quoted prices at times when no transaction occurs should
overcome the non-synchronous trading problem. If the close-of-day prices from
either a trade or a quote are synchronous, then the Scholes-Williams bias is no
longer an issue.
9 Fisher (1966): 'Some New Stock-market Indexes', Journal of Business, 39, 191-225.
10 Scholes and Williams (1977), 'Estimating Betas from Nonsynchronous Data', Journal of Financial
Economics, 5, 309-327.
38
A1.3.2 Price-adjustment delays
Dimson (1979) and Cohen et al. (1983)11 consider more persistent price-
adjustment delays, due to frictions in the capital market, which may affect
quotation as well as trade prices. These authors find a different pattern of biases in
beta from that analysed by Scholes and Williams, as shown in Table A1.2. Also,
they find that these biases occur even for interval lengths longer than a single day,
with estimates becoming asymptotically consistent as the period length is
increased.
Table A1.2: Bias in beta estimation due to price adjustment lags
Type Direction of bias in beta estimate
Infrequently traded securities Downwards
Very frequently traded securities Upwards
A1.3.3 Length of the investment horizon
Levhari and Levy (1977)12 comment on a different form of bias in calculated beta
coefficients: several researchers report a tendency for high-risk (aggressive) stocks
to earn lower returns than those estimated by the CAPM, while low-risk
(defensive) stocks exceed predictions. Levhari and Levy give an explanation
based on a discrepancy between the actual and theoretical length of the investment
horizon. The CAPM assumes that investors maximise their returns over a single
time period, which may be of any length as long as it is identical for all investors.
When the assumed investment horizon differs from the actual one used by
investors, the estimated beta coefficient will be systematically biased. The
direction of this effect varies according to whether the assumed horizon is too
long or too short, as summarised in Table A1.3.
l Dimson (1979), 'Risk Management When Shares are Subject to Infrequent Trading', Journal of
Financial Economics, 7, 197-226; Cohen, Hawawini, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1983), 'Friction in
the Trading Process and the Estimation of Systematic Risk', Journal of Financial Economics, 12, 263-278.
12 Levhari and Levy (1977), 'The Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Investment Horizon', Review of
Economic Studies, 92-104.
39
Table A1.3: Bias in beta estimation due to investment horizon length
Type Assumed investment Assumed investment
horizon is too long horizon is too short
Aggressive stock (J > 1) Beta is over-estimated Beta is under-estimated
Neutral stock (J3 = 1) Beta is correctly estimated Beta is correctly estimated
Defensive stock ( < 1) Beta is under-estimated Beta is over-estimated
The authors argue that the true horizon for most investors is likely to be more than
a year, thus estimates based on a period length shorter than this will tend to under-
estimate high beta values and over-estimate low ones.
A1.3.4 International differences in interval effects
The biases in estimated beta values for different national markets are unlikely to
be of the same degree and may not even be in the same direction. First, the
availability of quotation data for some markets should reduce misestimation in
these cases, while serious biases remain in other markets. Second, differences in
transaction costs and trading methods may affect the extent of adjustment delays
and non-synchronous trading problems, such that the degree of autocorrelation in
market returns, varies between countries.
Third, there is some evidence that the size of the relevant stock market affects the
seriousness of the intervalling effect. Berglund et al. (1983)13 find the length of
the adjustment process to be related to the total turnover of the exchange rather
than the trading frequency of the particular stock, such that adjustment takes
longer in a small stock market. Martikainen and Perttunen (1991)14 demonstrate
that, contrary to the findings of Handa et al. (1989), the size effect tends to
increase rather than decrease with the return interval in a thin stock market.
13 Berglund, Wahlroos and Ornmark (1983), 'The Weak-form Efficiency of the Finnish and Scandinavian
Stock Exchanges', Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 85, 521-530.
14 Martikainen and Perttunen (1991), 'Return Intervals, Systematic Risk Estimates and Firm Size',
Economic Letters, 36, 311-315.
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A1.4 Changes in company structure or environment
Some of the arguments outlined above imply that a longer rather than a shorter returns
interval should be used to estimate beta. However, use of a longer interval (say, one
month) requires several years' data, whereas a beta estimate based on daily data could be
calculated for a single year. The common approach of calculating a monthly beta from
data over a five-year period is flawed if the company's capital structure or operating
environment is not constant over this time.
A1.4.1 Changes in company gearing
The CAPM implicitly assumes that a company's gearing ratio is constant over
time and that its marginal gearing (the proportions in which debt and equity are
currently being issued) is therefore equal to its overall gearing ratio at the present
time. For real-world companies, however, significant shifts in gearing over
relatively short periods of time can be observed. When data over a long period
(say, five years) is used to estimate a company's equity beta and its gearing ratio
changes over this time, calculation of its asset beta using end-of-period gearing is
likely to be misleading. The riskiness of the company's equity tends to change
with its gearing ratio and so the use of an inappropriate gearing ratio causes the
asset beta to be miscalculated.
When a company's gearing ratio is found to change over the estimation period,
two approaches may be used:
* use the average gearing ratio over the estimation interval, rather than its
end-of-period value;
* carry out the estimation over a shorter interval; say, one year instead of
five.
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The second approach is related to the intervalling effects covered in Section A1.3:
clearly, the gearing issue must be considered along with the issues discussed
earlier when a choice of estimation period is made.
A1.4.2 Regulatory changes
As outlined in Section A1.3, one approach to the assessment of regulatory risk is
to study the effect on a company's beta value when its regulatory regime is
altered. This methodology requires beta values to be estimated over short time
periods of one to two years so that the effects of recent changes can be assessed.
In such cases, the short data period requires beta values to be estimated from daily
rather than monthly returns so that the number of data points is sufficient for a
reasonable degree of accuracy to be obtained.
A1.5: Estimating debt betas
In Section 2 the relationship between asset, equity and debt betas was briefly outlined.
Although this paper has adopted the standard assumption of zero debt betas it is worth
considering the evidence on the value of debt betas if this assumption is relaxed. It is not
possible to apply any assumption but that of zero debt betas in the main body of the work,
owing to the amount and sophistication of the information required. However, by
considering the available evidence the relevant importance of this assumption can be
tested.
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Table A1.4: Data on debt betas
Company Bond Premium (basis points) Debt betaa
BAA £250m, 8.5%, 2021 85 0.14
Electrobras $50m, 10%, 1999 431 0.72
Telebras Lira 350 billion, 13%, 1999 345 0.58
BT £500m, 7.125%, 2003 16 0.03
BT £229m, 12.25%, 2006 35 0.06
Nynex $150m, 8.75%, 2004 76 0.13
Note: a A simplification has been made by assuming that the equity risk premium is constant across
countries at 6%.
Sources: Financial Times and Datastream.
As can be seen from the table, debt betas can vary from close to zero, for large utility
companies in developed countries, to close to one, for utilities in developing countries. Of
course, the assumptions underlying the debt beta calculation have an important impact on
the value found and so these figures are being used purely for illustrative purposes rather
than precise measures of the actual debt betas. Table A1.5 provides an estimate of the
asset beta for two of the companies with debt betas. These are then compared to the asset
betas calculated on the standard assumption.
Table A1.5: Asset beta estimates
Company Equity beta Debt beta Gearing Asset beta
BT 0.98 0.06 0.12 0.87
Nynex 0.69 0.13 0.35 0.49
Table A1.6: Impact on asset beta estimate
Company Zero debt beta Non-zero debt beta
BT 0.87 0.87
Nynex 0.45 0.49
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From Table Al.6 it can be seen that the impact of relaxing the assumption is slight. In
BT's case there is no change in the asset beta estimate while for Nynex the asset beta
rises by 0.04. Where larger debt betas exist it is likely that a more significant impact will
be observed, however, lack of data makes quantifying this impact impossible.
A1.6 Conclusions
The estimation of beta values, particularly in an international context, is fraught with
practical and theoretical difficulties. Hence a great deal of care must be taken in making
the estimates if any meaningful comparisons are to be drawn. First, some methodology
for overcoming the theoretical sources of bias must be established, perhaps involving a
particular choice of returns interval or a regression procedure for obtaining unbiased
estimates. Second, appropriate and consistent data must be collected for the various
countries, and then beta estimates calculated in the same way in each case.
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Appendix A2 Asset Beta Estimates
Key: e indicates an equity rather than an asset beta estimate.
'indicates that security has severe infrequent trading problems and is likely to be
biased downwards.
A2.1 Europe
A2.1.1 Austria Index: Austria traded index (ATX)
OMV AG (elec) Vienna Airport
Five-year beta 0.85 0.50 (1992-95)
1990 1.34
1991 0.65
1992 0.83 -
1993 0.69 0.71
1994 0.75 1.05
A2.1.2 Belgium Index: Brussels Stock Exchange General Index
Electrabel (electricity) Tractebel (electricity & gas)
Five-year beta 0.40 0.46
1990 0.26 0.97
1991 0.33 0.33
1992 0.41 0.34
1993 0.48 0.28
1994 0.64 0.39
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A2.1.3 Denmark Index: Copenhagen Stock Exchange Index
Tele Danmark Copenhagen Airport
1994-95 1.10 0.44et
A2.1.4 France Index: Paris CAC40
Lyonnaise des Eaux-Dumez (water)
Five-year beta 0.64
1990 0.89
1991 0.66
1992 0.47
1993 0.59
1994 0.63
A2.1.5 Germany Index: Deutsche Aktien (DAX)
Regional energy companies
Badenwerk Berliner Kraft & Eschweiler Isar Amperwerke
Licht Bergwerk
Five-year beta 0.23 0.25 0.03t 0.12
1990 0.31 0.36 0.10 0.12
1991 0.36 0.24 -0.05 0.13
1992 0.19 0.02 0.05 0.05
1993 0.09 0.16 0.03 0.13
1994 -0.02 0.24 -0.04 0.19
Regional energy companies (continued)
Rheinelectra RWE Thyssen VEBA VIAG
Five-year beta 0.54 2.34* 0.84 0.83 0.77
1990 0.57 1.42 0.98 0.93 0.98
1991 0.49 2.11 0.81 0.86 0.80
1992 0.29 1.94 0.88 0.63 0.72
1993 0.79 2.19 0.82 0.62 0.71
1994 0.54 2.25 0.70 0.84 0.66
* High value due to large negative gearing ratio.
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A2.1.6 Italy Index: Milan Stock Exchange index
Italgas Acquedotti Acquedotti Telecom Ferrovie Nord
Potabili de Ferrari Italia Milano
(water) RNC (water) (railway)
Five-year beta 0.44 0.16 " 0.47 1 0.30 0.44 . t
1990 0.36 0.42 1.28 0.21 -
1991 0.46 0.22 0.89 0.19 0.63
1992 0.31 0.22 0.24 0.16 0.13
1993 0.46 0.16 0.11 0.23 0.44
1994 0.58 0.08 0.32 0.45 0.65
A2.1.7 The Netherlands Index: Amsterdam All Share general index
KPN (post & telecoms)
Five-year beta 0.61 e
A2.1.8 Norway Index: Oslo Stock Exchange index
Norsk Hydro (gas)
Five-year beta 0.69
1990 0.57
1991 0.62
1992 0.77
1993 0.57
1994 0.71
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A2.1.9 Spain Index: IBEX 35
Endesa Elec. Enher Sevillana Gas Aguas
Reunidas Natural Barcelona
SDG (water)
Five-year 0.58 0.60 0.31 0.24 0.81 0.57
beta
1990 0.40 - - 0.22 0.67 -
1991 0.31 - - 0.14 0.61 -
1992 0.53 - - 0.23 0.57 -
1993 0.65 - 0.32 0.21 0.94 0.68
1994 0.88 0.54 0.30 0.32 1.12 0.74
A2.1.10 Sweden Index: Veckans Affarer weighted all share index
Sydkraft (gas) Kinnevik Ind. (telecoms)
Five-year beta 0.34' 0.50'
1990 - 0.32
1991 - 0.13
1992 0.32 0.57
1993 0.32 0.51
1994 0.35 0.88
A2.1.11 Switzerland Index: Swiss market index
Electrowatt (elec) Motor-Columbus (elec)
Five-year beta 0.15' 0.24'
1990 - 0.34
1991 _
1992 0.12
1993 0.14 -
1994 0.19 0.13
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A2.1.12 UK Index: FT-SE 100
Regional electricity companies
Eastern East London Manweb Midlands Northern
Midlands
Five-year 0.55 0.56 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.54
beta
1990 - - - - - -
1991 - - - - - -
1992 0.50 0.46 0.51 0.55 0.46 0.49
1993 0.33 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.44 0.35
1994 0.62 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.63 0.66
Regional electricity companies (continued)
Norweb SEEBOARD Southern South South Yorkshire
Wales Western
Five-year 0.59 0.64 0.61 0.61 0.52 0.56
beta
1990 - - - - - -
1991 - - - - - -
1992 0.55 0.56 0.58 0.65 0.46 0.52
1993 0.32 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.33 0.45
1994 0.69 0.76 0.66 0.57 0.54 0.55
Generators and vertically integrated electricity companies
National PowerGen Scottish- Hydro-Electric Northern
Power Power Ireland
Electricity
Five-year beta 0.78 0.75 0.67 0.58 0.60O
1990 - - - - -
1991 - - - -
1992 0.66 0.66 - -
1993 0.84 0.82 0.69 0.63
1994 1.03 1.05 1.16 1.01
t 1993-95 figure.
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Gas and telecommunications
British Gas British Telecom Vodaphone
Five-year beta 0.84 0.87 1.13
1990 0.92 0.88 1.27
1991 0.84 0.77 0.86
1992 0.59 0.70 1.15
1993 0.89 0.95 1.22
1994 1.08 1.02 1.10
Water
Anglian Northumbrian North West Severn Trent Southern
Five-year beta 0.53 0.66 0.71 0.79 0.60
1990 - - - -
1991 0.60 1.08 0.74 1.12 0.66
1992 0.69 1.05 0.97 1.12 0.73
1993 0.36 0.25 0.42 0.46 0.30
1994 0.64 0.56 0.79 0.77 0.72
Water (continued)
South West Thames Welsh Wessex Yorkshire
Five-year beta 0.87 0.63 0.76 0.66 0.53
1990 - - - - -
1991 1.75 0.71 0.95 0.61 0.54
1992 1.47 0.80 1.18 0.93 0.65
1993 0.45 0.38 0.39 0.25 0.32
1994 0.55 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.55
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A2.2 North America
A2.2.1 Canada Index: Toronto Stock Exchange composite index
Atco Canadian Utilities Nova Corp.
Five-year beta 0.08 0.15 0.55
1990 0.12 0.13 0.42
1991 0.11 0.07 0.40
1992 0.03 0.18 0.50
1993 0.07 0.11 0.46
1994 0.06 0.21 0.68
Nova Scotia Transalta Bell Canada BC Telecom
Power Enterprises
(telecommunications)
Five-year beta 0.13 t 0.36t 0.31 0.31
1990 - 0.40 0.30 0.30
1991 0.22 0.27 0.30
1992 - 0.24 0.33 0.40
1993 0.04 0.05 0.17 0.06
1994 0.20 0.64 0.40 0.46
t 1992-95 figure.
A2.2.2 United States Index: Dow Jones composite 65
Combined electricity/gas companies
Baltimore CMS Energy Consolidated LG&E Long Island
Gas & Elec Edison NY Energy Lighting
Five-year beta 0.32 0.19 0.47 0.19 0.15'
1990 0.29 0.22 0.38 - 0.16
1991 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.14
1992 0.22 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.08
1993 0.45 0.14 0.28 0.19 0.19
1994 0.47 0.27 0.39 0.42 0.21
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Combined electricity/gas companies (continued)
MDU Niagara Northern Pacific Gas Peco Energy
Resources Mohawk States Power & Electric
Power
Five-yearbeta 0.12' 0.25 0.38 0.37 0.31
1990 0.08 0.26 0.48 0.36 0.33
1991 0.14 0.18 0.25 0.32 0.18
1992 0.05 0.20 0.25 0.26 0.21
1993 0.17 0.28 0.41 0.35 0.40
1994 0.25 0.41 0.50 0.57 0.42
Combined electricity/gas companies (continued)
Public Service San Diego Gas Scana Washington
Co. of Colorado & Electric Water Power
Five-year beta 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.12'
1990 0.27 0.23 0.17 0.10
1991 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.07
1992 0.18 0.07 0.14 0.03
1993 0.31 0.24 0.16 0.16
1994 0.36 0.43 0.35 0.23
Gas companies
Atlanta Gas Brooklyn Union Connecticut Enserch
Light Gas Natural Gas
Five-year beta 0.19 0.14' 0.14' 0.39
1990 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.40
1991 0.23 0.08 0.24 0.43
1992 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.36
1993 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.31
1994 0.29 0.41 0.17 0.51
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Gas companies (continued)
Florida Public Natural Fuel New Jersey Nicor
Utilities Gas Co Resources
Five-year beta 0.08t 0.21 0.10' 0.29
1990 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.28
1991 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.31
1992 0.01 0.31 0.06 0.18
1993 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.18
1994 0.09 0.37 0.20 0.48
Gas companies (continued)
North Carolina Northwest ONEOK Wisconsin Energy
Natural Gas Natural Gas
Five-year beta 0.06t 0.12' 0.35 0.29
1990 0.12 0.18 0.38 0.26
1991 0.05 0.13 0.33 0.21
1992 -0.06 0.04 0.31 0.13
1993 0.00 0.11 0.39 0.43
1994 0.14 0.09 0.41 0.49
Electricity companies
AEP Carolina Duke Power Entergy KU Energy
Industries Power & Corp.
Light
Five-year beta 0.46 0.37 0.40 0.25 0.24
1990 0.68 0.40 0.34 0.26 0.25
1991 0.19 0.27 0.30 0.19 0.16
1992 0.43 0.19 0.24 0.16 0.16
1993 0.23 0.49 0.47 0.29 0.34
1994 0.84 0.57 0.42 0.36 0.32
53
Electricity companies (continued)
New England Puget Sound Union Electric Unicom
Electric Systems Power & Light
Five-year beta 0.24 0.18 0.27 0.31
1990 0.27 0.15 0.25 0.43
1991 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.24
1992 0.18 0.13 0.25 0.16
1993 0.30 0.20 0.34 0.28
1994 0.43 0.32 0.48 0.47
Water
Consumers Water Philadelphia Suburban
Five-year beta 0.07' 0.12 t
1990 0.12 0.15
1991 0.04 0.07
1992 0.20 0.13
1993 0.12 0.11
1994 -0.02 0.14
Telecommunications
AT&T Bell Atlantic Bell South Nynex
Five-year beta 0.72 0.57 0.55 0.45
1990 0.96 0.85 0.65 0.59
1991 0.69 0.52 0.62 0.38
1992 0.53 0.19 0.31 0.30
1993 0.78 0.56 0.55 0.33
1994 0.60 0.50 0.52 0.61
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A2.3 South America
A2.3.1 Argentina Index: IFC emerging markets weekly index
NB: These are weekly, not daily, beta estimates.
Central Costanera Central Puerto (elec) Telef6nica de
(elec) Argentina
1994-95 0.74 e 0.87 -
1992-95 - - 0.86 e
Index: Dow Jones Composite 65 (daily beta estimates)
Central Costanera Central Puerto ADS Telefonica de
ADR Argentina ADR
1994-95 1.92 e 1.21 -
1992-95 - - 1.57 e
A2.3.2 Chile Index: IFC emerging markets weekly index
NB: These are weekly, not daily, beta estimates
[ Endesa (elec) Emelsa (elec) Emelat (elec) Entel (telecoms)
|Five-year beta 0.95 e 0.72 e 0.77 C 1.20 e
Enersis (elec) Enersis ADR* Chilgener (elec) Chilgener ADR*
|Five-year beta 1.24 e 1.09 e (1993-95) 1.09 e 0.76 e (1994-95)
* ADR is quoted in $ and the beta calculation uses daily data and the Dow Jones Composite 65 index
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A2.4. South-east Asia
A2.4.1 Japan Index: Nikkei 50
Tokyo Chubu Kansai Matsushita Mitsubishi NTT
Electric Electric Electric Electric Electric (telecoms)
Power Power Power Works
Five-year 0.28 0.29 0.34 0.57 0.69 0.62
beta
1990 0.42 0.52 0.54 0.70 0.89 0.48
1991 0.32 0.25 0.37 0.60 0.75 0.65
1992 0.26 0.32 0.30 0.53 0.62 0.60
1993 0.36 0.30 0.37 0.62 0.65 0.98
1994 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.52 0.67 0.68
A2.5 Australia and New Zealand
A2.5.1 Australia Index: Australian All-share Index
AGL
Five-year beta 0.38
.25
0.39
0.28
0.28
0.45
A2.5.2 New Zealand Index: NZ Capital 40 Index
Telecom Corp.
Five-year beta 0.97
1990 n/a
1991 0.52
1992 0.60
1993 1.20
1994 1.06
Note: NZ Capital 40 Index is not available prior to 1991.
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Appendix A3 Examples of the Interval Problem
Five-year beta estimates using daily, weekly and monthly data.
A3.1 US companies Index: Dow Jones Composite 65
Table A3.1: US gas companies
Atlanta Brooklyn Connecticut Enserch Florida Natural Fuel
Gas Light Union Gas Natural Public Gas Co
Gas Utilities
Daily 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.39 0.08 0.21
Weekly 0.26 0.11 0.14 0.38 0.14 0.24
Monthly 0.19 0.21 -0.05 0.56 0.19 0.26
Table A3.1 (continued)
New Jersey Nicor N. Carolina Northwest ONEOK Wisconsin
Resources Natural Natural Energy
Gas Gas
Daily 0.10 0.29 0.06 0.12 0.35 0.29
Weekly 0.13 0.26 0.24 0.10 0.27 0.30
Monthly 0.21 0.18 0.65 0.19 0.23 0.21
Table A3.2: US gas companies' average beta
Average
Daily 0.20
Weekly 0.21
Monthly 0.25
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Table A3.3: US water companies
Consumers Water Philadelphia Suburban
Daily 0.07 0.12
Weekly 0.18 0.14
Monthly 0.32 0.25
A3.2 UK companies Index: FTSE-100 index
Table A3.4: UK RECs
Eastern East London Manweb Midlands Northern
Midlands
Daily 0.55 0.56 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.58
Weekly 0.66 0.74 0.70 0.63 0.71 0.65
Monthly 0.83 0.83 1.07 1.00 1.04 1.00
Table A3.4 (continued)
Norweb SEEBOARD Southern South South Yorkshire
Wales Western
Daily 0.63 0.64 0.61 0.61 0.52 0.56
Weekly 0.67 0.83 0.71 0.72 0.77 0.64
Monthly 0.83 1.13 0.95 1.08 0.92 0.84
Table A3.5: UK RECs' average beta
Average
Daily 0.58
Weekly 0.70
Monthly 0.96
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Table A3.6: UK gas and telecommunications companies
British Gas BT
Daily 0.84 0.87
Weekly 0.76 0.91
Monthly 0.67 0.82
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Appendix A4 Confidence Intervals for Beta Estimates
95% confidence intervals for asset beta estimates for BT calculated using the FTSE 100
index.
Table A4.1: Confidence intervals for five-year beta estimates
calculated from data with different interval lengths
Daily data Weekly data Monthly data
Asset beta estimate 0.87 0.91 0.82
Upper bound 0.92 1.02 1.03
Lower bound 0.81 0.79 0.61
Number of observations 1,422 294 65
Table A4.2: Confidence intervals for daily beta estimates for BT
calculated over periods of different lengths
Five year (1990-95) One year (1994)
Asset beta estimate 0.87 1.02
Upper bound 0.92 1.13
Lower bound 0.81 0.90
Number of observations 1,422 252
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